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Democratic societies are built around the principle of free and fair elections, that each citizen’s
vote should count equal. National elections can be regarded as large-scale social experiments, where
people are grouped into usually large numbers of electoral districts and vote according to their
preferences. The large number of samples implies certain statistical consequences for the polling
results which can be used to identify election irregularities. Using a suitable data collapse, we
find that vote distributions of elections with alleged fraud show a kurtosis of hundred times more
than normal elections on certain levels of data aggregation. As an example we show that reported
irregularities in recent Russian elections are indeed well explained by systematic ballot stuffing and
develop a parametric model quantifying to which extent fraudulent mechanisms are present. We
show that if specific statistical properties are present in an election, the results do not represent the
will of the people. We formulate a parametric test detecting these statistical properties in election
results. Remarkably, this technique produces similar outcomes irrespective of the data resolution
and thus allows for cross-country comparisons.
Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of every
democratic society [1]. A central characteristic of elec-
tions being free and fair is that each citizen’s vote counts
equal. However, already Joseph Stalin believed that ”It’s
not the people who vote that count; It’s the people who
count the votes.” How can it be distinguished whether
an election outcome represents the will of the people or
the will of the counters?
Elections can be seen as large-scale social experiments.
A country is segmented into a usually large number of
electoral units. Each unit represents a standardized ex-
periment where each citizen articulates his/her political
preference via a ballot. Although elections are one of
the central pillars of a fully functioning democratic pro-
cess, relatively little is known about how election fraud
impacts and corrupts the results of these standardized
experiments [2, 3].
There is a plethora of ways of tampering with election
outcomes, for instance the redrawing of district bound-
aries known as gerrymandering, or the barring of certain
demographics from their right to vote. Some practices
of manipulating voting results leave traces which may
be detected by statistical methods. Recently, Benford’s
law [4] experienced a renaissance as a potential election
fraud detection tool [5]. In its original and naive formu-
lation, Benford’s ”law” is the observation that for many
real world processes the logarithm of the first significant
digit is uniformly distributed. Deviations from this law
may indicate that other, possibly fraudulent mechanisms
are at work. For instance, suppose a significant number
of reported vote counts in districts is completely made
up and invented by someone preferring to pick numbers
which are multiples of ten. The digit ”0” would then oc-
cur much more often as the last digit in the vote counts
when compared to uncorrupted numbers. Voting results
from Russia [6], Germany [7], Argentina [8] and Nigeria
[9] have been tested for the presence of election fraud us-
ing variations of this idea of digit-based analysis. How-
ever, the validity of Benford’s law as a fraud detection
method is subject to controversy [10, 11]. The problem
is that one needs to firmly establish a baseline of what
the expected distribution of digit occurrences for fair elec-
tions should be. Only then it can be asserted if actual
numbers are over- or underrepresented and thus suspi-
cious. What is missing in this context is a theory that
links specific fraud mechanisms to statistical anomalies
[10].
A different strategy for detecting signals of election
fraud is to look at the distribution of vote and turnout
numbers as in [12]. This has been extensively done for
the Russian presidential and Duma elections over the last
20 years [13–15]. These works focus on the task of detect-
ing two mechanisms, the stuffing of ballot boxes and the
reporting of contrived numbers. It has been noted that
these mechanisms are able to produce different features
of vote and turnout distributions than those observed in
fair elections. While for Russian elections between 1996
and 2003 these features were ”only” observed in a rel-
atively small number of electoral units, they eventually
spread and percolated through the entire Russian federa-
tion from 2003 onwards. According to Myagkov and Or-
deshook [14] ”[o]nly Kremlin apologists and Putin syco-
phants argue that Russian elections meet the standards
of good democratic practice”. This point was further
substantiated with election results from the 2011 Duma
and 2012 presidential elections [16–18]. Here it was also
observed that ballot stuffing not only changes the shape
of vote and turnout distributions, but also induces a high
2correlation between them. Unusually high vote counts
tend to co-occur with unusually high turnout numbers.
Several recent advances in the understanding of sta-
tistical regularities of voting results are due to the ap-
plication of statistical physics concepts to quantitative
social dynamics [19]. In particular several approximate
statistical laws of how vote and turnout are distributed
have been identified [20–22], some of them are shown to
be valid across several countries [23, 24]. It is tempting
to think of deviations from these approximate statisti-
cal laws as potential indicators for election irregularities
which are valid cross-nationally. However, the magnitude
of these deviations may vary from country to country
due to different numbers and sizes of electoral districts.
Any statistical technique quantifying election anomalies
across countries should not depend on the size of the un-
derlying sample nor its aggregation level, i.e. the size
of the electoral units. As a consequence, a conclusive
and robust signal for a fraudulent mechanism, e.g. bal-
lot stuffing, must not disappear if the same dataset is
studied on different aggregation levels.
In this work we expand earlier work on statistical de-
tection of election anomalies in two directions. First, we
test for reported statistical features of voting results (and
deviations thereof) in a cross-national setting, and dis-
cuss their dependence on the level of data aggregation.
As the central point of this work we propose a parametric
model to statistically quantify to which extent fraudulent
processes, such as ballot stuffing, may have influenced
the observed election results. Remarkably, under the as-
sumption of coherent geographic voting patterns [24, 25],
the parametric model results do not depend significantly
on the aggregation level of the election data or the size
of the data sample.
DATA AND METHODS
Election data
Countries were selected by data availability. For each
country we require availability of at least one aggregation
level where the average population per territorial unit
n¯pop ≤ 5000. This limit for n¯pop was chosen to include a
large number of countries, that have a comparable level of
data resolution. We use data from recent parliamentary
elections in Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland,
Russia (2011), Spain and Switzerland, the European Par-
liament elections in Poland and presidential elections in
the France, Romania, Russia (2012) and Uganda. Here
we refer by ”unit” to any incarnation of an administra-
tive boundary (such as districts, precincts, wards, mu-
nicipals, provinces, etc.) of a country on any aggregation
level. If the voting results are available on different lev-
els of aggregation, we refer to them by Roman numbers,
i.e. Poland-I refers to the finest aggregation level for
Poland, Poland-II to the second finest, and so on. For
each unit on each aggregation level for each country we
have the data of the number of eligible persons to vote,
valid votes and votes for the winning party/candidate.
Voting results were obtained from official election home-
pages of the respective countries, for more details see SI
Tab.S1. Units with an electorate smaller than 100 are
excluded from the analysis, to prevent extreme turnout
and vote rates as artifacts from very small communities.
We tested robustness of our findings with respect to the
choice of a minimal electorate size and found that the
results do not significantly change if the minimal size is
set to 500.
The histograms for the 2d-vote-turnout distributions
(vtds) for the winning parties, also referred to as ”finger-
prints”, are shown in Fig.1.
Data collapse
It has been shown that by using an appropriate re-
scaling of election data, the distributions of votes and
turnouts approximately follow a Gaussian [24]. Let Wi
be the number of votes for the winning party and Ni the
number of voters in any unit i. A re-scaling function is
given by the logarithmic vote rate, νi = log
Ni−Wi
Wi
[24]. In
units where Wi ≥ Ni (due to errors in counting or fraud)
or Wi = 0 νi is not defined, and the unit is omitted
in our analysis. This is a conservative definition, since
districts with extreme but feasible vote and turnout rates
are neglected (for instance, in Russia 2012 there are 324
units with 100% vote and 100% turnout).
Parametric model
To motivate our parametric model for the vtd, observe
that the vtd for Russia and Uganda in Fig.1 are clearly
bimodal, both in turnout and votes. One cluster is at
intermediate levels of turnout and votes. Note that it
is smeared towards the upper right parts of the plot.
The second peak is situated in the vicinity of the 100%
turnout, 100% votes point. This suggests two modes
of fraud mechanisms being present, incremental and ex-
treme fraud. Incremental fraud means that with a given
rate ballots for one party are added to the urn and votes
for other parties are taken away. This occurs within a
fraction fi of units. In the election fingerprints in Fig.1
these units are those associated with the smearing to the
upper right side. Extreme fraud corresponds to report-
ing a complete turnout and almost all votes for a single
party. This happens in a fraction fe of units. These form
the second cluster near 100% turnout and votes for the
winning party.
For simplicity we assume that within each unit turnout
and voter preferences can be represented by a Gaussian
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FIG. 1. Election fingerprints: 2-d histograms of the number of units for a given voter turnout (x-axis) and the percentage of
votes (y-axis) for the winning party (or candidate) in recent elections from different countries (from left to right, top to bottom:
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Poland, Romania, Russia ’11 and ’12, Spain, Switzerland, Uganda) are
shown. Color represents the number of units with corresponding vote and turnout numbers. The units usually cluster around
a given turnout and vote percentage level. In Uganda and Russia these clusters are ’smeared out’ to the upper right region of
the plots, reaching a second peak at a 100% turnout and a 100% of votes (red circles). In Canada there are clusters around
two different vote values, corresponding to the Que´be´cois and English Canada (see SI). In Finland the main cluster is smeared
out into two directions (indicative of voter mobilization due to controversies surrounding the True Finns).
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FIG. 2. A simple way to compare data from different elec-
tions in different countries on a similar aggregation level is to
present the distributions of the logarithmic vote rates νi of
the winning parties as rescaled distributions with zero-mean
and unit-variance [24]. Large deviations from other countries
can be seen for Uganda and Russia with the plain eye. For
more detailed results see Tab.S3.
distribution with the mean and standard deviation taken
from the actual sample, see SI Fig.S1. This assumption
of normality is not valid in general. For example the
Canadian election fingerprint of Fig.1 is clearly bimodal
in vote preferences (but not in turnout). In this case, the
deviations from approximate Gaussianity are due to a
significant heterogeneity within the country. In the par-
ticular case of Canada this is known to be due to the mix
of the anglo- and francophone population. Normality of
the observed vote and turnout distributions is discussed
in the SI, see Tab.S2.
Let Vi be the number of valid votes in unit i. The first
step in the model is to compute the empirical turnout
distribution, Vi/Ni, and the empirical vote distribution,
Wi/Ni, over all units from the election data. To compute
the model vtd the following protocol is then applied to
each unit i.
• For each i, take the electorate size Ni from the
election data.
• Model turnout and vote rates for i are drawn from
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FIG. 3. For each country on each aggregation level skewness and kurtosis of the logarithmic vote rate distributions are shown
as a function of the average electorate per unit n¯pop and the number of units n. Results for Russia and Uganda are highlighted.
The values for all other countries cluster around 0 and 3, which are the values expected for normal distributions. On the largest
aggregation level election data from Uganda and Russia can not be distinguished from other countries.
turnout (vote) distribution is estimated from the
election data as the value that maximizes the em-
pirical turnout (vote) distribution. The model vari-
ances are also estimated from the width of the em-
pirical distributions, see SI and Fig.S1 for details.
• Incremental fraud. With probability fi ballots are
taken away from both the non-voters and the op-
position and are added to the winning party’s bal-
lots. The fraction of ballots which are shifted to
the winning party is again estimated from the ac-
tual election data.
• Extreme fraud. With probability fe almost all bal-
lots from the non-voters and the opposition are
added to the winning party’s ballots.
The first step of the above protocol ensures that the ac-
tual electorate size numbers is represented in the model.
The second step guarantees that the overall dispersion of
vote and turnout preferences of the country’s population
are correctly represented in the model. Given nonzero
values for fi and fe, incremental and extreme fraud are
then applied in the third and fourth step, respectively.
For a complete specification of these fraud mechanisms,
see the SI.
Estimating the fraud parameters
Values for fi and fe are reverse engineered from
the election data in the following way. First, model
vtds are generated according to the above scheme, for
each combination of (fi, fe) values, where fi and fe ∈
{0, 0.01, 0.02, . . .1}. We then compute the point-wise
sum of the square difference of model and observed vote
distributions for each pair (fi, fe) and extract the pair
giving the minimal difference. This procedure is repeated
for 100 iterations, leading to 100 pairs of fraud parame-
ters (fi, fe). In the following we report the average values
of these fi and fe values, respectively, and their standard
deviations. For more details see SI.
RESULTS
Fingerprints
Fig.1 shows 2-d histograms (vtds) for the number of
units for a given fraction of voter turnout (x-axis) and
for the percentage of votes for the winning party (y-axis).
Results are shown for Austria, Canada, Czech Repub-
lic, Finland, France, Poland, Romania, Russia, Spain,
Switzerland and Uganda. For each of these countries
the data is shown on the finest aggregation level, where
n¯pop ≤ 5000. These figures can be interpreted as fin-
gerprints of several processes and mechanisms leading to
the overall election results. For Russia and Uganda the
shape of these fingerprints differ strongly from the other
countries. In particular there is a large number of territo-
rial units (thousands) with approximately 100% percent
turnout and at the same time about 100 % of votes for
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FIG. 4. Comparison of observed and modeled vtds for (top to
bottom) Russia 2011, Russia 2012, Uganda and Switzerland.
The left column shows the observed election fingerprints, the
middle column shows a fit with the fraud model. The col-
umn to the right shows the expected model outcome of fair
elections (i.e. absence of fraudulent mechanisms fi = fe = 0).
For Switzerland the fair and fitted model are almost the same.
The results for Russia and Uganda can be explained by the
model assuming a large number of fraudulent units.
the winning party.
Approximate normality
In Fig.2 we show the distribution of νi for each country.
Roughly, to first order the data from different countries
collapse to an approximate Gaussian, as previously ob-
served [24]. Clearly, the data for Russia falls out out
of line. Skewness and kurtosis for the distributions of
νi are listed for each data-set and aggregation level in
Tab.S3. Most strikingly, the kurtosis of the distributions
for Russia (2003, 2007, 2011 and 2012) exceed the kur-
tosis of each other country on the coarsest aggregation
level by a factor of two to three. Values for the skewness
of the logarithmic vote rate distributions for Russia are
also persistently below the values for each other country.
Note that for the vast majority of the countries skewness
and kurtosis for the distribution of νi are in the vicinity
of 0 and 3, respectively (which are the values one would
expect for normal distributions). However, the moments
of the distributions do depend on the data aggregation
level. Fig.3 shows skewness and kurtosis for the distri-
butions of νi for each election on each aggregation level.
By increasing the data resolution, skewness and kurtosis
for Russia decrease and approach similar values as ob-
served in the rest of the countries, see also SI Tab.S3.
These measures depend on the data resolution and thus
can not be used as unambiguous signals for statistical
anomalies. As will be shown, the fraud parameters fi
and fe do not significantly depend on the aggregation
level or total sample size.
Voting model results
Estimation results for fi and fe are given in Tab.S3
for all countries on each aggregation level. They are zero
(or almost zero) in all of the cases except for Russia and
Uganda. In the right column of Fig.4 we show the model
results for Russia (2011 and 2012), Uganda and Switzer-
land for fi = fe = 0. The case where both fraud param-
eters are zero corresponds to the absence of incremental
and extreme fraud mechanisms in the model and can be
called the ’fair election’ case. In the middle column of
Fig.4 we show results for the estimated values of fi and
fe. The left column shows the actual vtd of the election.
Values of fi and fe significantly larger than zero indi-
cate that the observed distributions may be affected by
fraudulent actions. To describe the smearing from the
main peak to the upper right corner which is observed
for Russia and Uganda, an incremental fraud probability
around fi = 0.64(1) is needed for United Russia in 2011
and fi = 0.39(1) in 2012. This means fraud in about 64%
of the units in 2011 and 39% in 2012. In the second peak
close to 100% turnout there are roughly 3,000 units with
100% of votes for United Russia in the 2011 data, rep-
resenting an electorate of more than two million people.
Best fits yield fe = 0.033(4) for 2011 and fe = 0.021(3)
for 2012, i.e. two to three percent of all electoral units
experience extreme fraud. A more detailed comparison
of the model performance for the Russian parliamentary
elections of 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2012 is found in Fig.S2.
Fraud parameters for the Uganda data in Fig.4 are found
to be fi = 0.49(1) and fe = 0.011(3). A best fit for the
election data from Switzerland gives fi = fe = 0.
These results are drastically more robust to variations
of the aggregation level of the data than the previously
discussed distribution moments skewness and kurtosis,
Fig.5 and Tab.S3. Even if we aggregate the Russian data
up to the coarsest level of federal subjects (approximately
85 units, depending on the election), fe estimates are still
at least two standard deviations above zero, fi estimates
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FIG. 5. For each country on each aggregation level values for fi and fe as given in Tab.S3 are shown as a function of the
average electorate per unit n¯pop and the number of units n. Results for Russia and Uganda are highlighted. The values for all
other countries are close to zero, indicating that the data is best described by the absence of the ballot stuffing mechanism.
Parameter values for fi and fe for Russia and Uganda remain significantly above zero for all aggregation levels. Note that in
D the error margins for fe values in the range 10 < n < 100 (as well as for the corresponding values fe in C) get increasingly
large, whereas fi estimates in this range stay robust.
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FIG. 6. The ballot stuffing mechanism can be visualized by
considering the cumulative number of votes as a function of
turnout. Each country’s election winner is represented by a
curve which typically takes the shape of a sigmoid function
reaching a plateau. In contrast to the other countries, Russia
and Uganda do not tend to develop this plateau but instead
show a pronounced increase (boost) close to complete turnout.
Both irregularities are indicative of the two ballot stuffing
modes being present.
more than ten standard deviations. Similar observations
hold for Uganda. For no other country, on no other ag-
gregation level, such deviations are observed. The para-
metric model yields similar results for the same data on
different levels of aggregation, as long as the values max-
imizing the empirical vote (turnout) distribution and the
distribution width remains invariant. In other words,
as long as units with similar vote (turnout) character-
istics are aggregated to larger units, the overall shapes
of the empirical distribution functions are preserved and
the model estimates do not change significantly. Note
that more detailed assumptions about possible mecha-
nisms leading to large heterogeneity in the data (such
as the Que´be´cois in Canada or voter mobilization in the
Helsinki region in Finland, see SI) may have an effect
on the estimate of fi. However, these can under no cir-
cumstances explain the mechanism of extreme fraud. Re-
sults for elections in Sweden, UK and USA, where voting
results are only available on a much coarser resolution
(n¯pop > 20000), are given in Tab.S4.
Another way to visualize the intensity of election irreg-
ularities is the cumulative number of votes as a function
of the turnout, Fig.6. For each turnout level the total
number of votes from units with this or lower levels are
shown. Each curve corresponds to the respective election
winner in a different country, with average electorate per
unit of comparable order of magnitude. Usually these
cdfs level off and form a plateau from the party’s maxi-
mal vote count on. Again this is not the case for Russia
and Uganda. Both show a boost phase of increased ex-
treme fraud toward the right end of the distribution (red
circles). Russia never even shows a tendency to form
7a plateau. As long as the empirical vote distribution
functions remain invariant under data aggregation as dis-
cussed above, the shape of these cdfs will be preserved
too. Note that Fig.6. demonstrates that these effects are
decisive for winning the 50% majority in Russia 2011.
DISCUSSION
We demonstrate that it is not sufficient to discuss the
approximate normality of turnout, vote or logarithmic
vote rate distributions, to decide if election results may
be corrupted or not. We show that these methods can
lead to ambiguous signals, since results depend strongly
on the aggregation level of the election data. We de-
veloped a model to estimate parameters quantifying to
which extent the observed election results can be ex-
plained by ballot stuffing. The resulting parameter values
are shown to be insensitive to the choice of the aggre-
gation level. Note that the error margins for fe values
start to increase by decreasing n below 100, see Fig.5D,
whereas fi estimates stay robust even for very small n.
It is imperative to emphasize that the shape of the fin-
gerprints in Fig.1 will deviate from pure 2-d Gaussian dis-
tributions also as a result of non-fraudulent mechanisms,
but due to heterogeneity in the population. The purpose
of the parametric model is to quantify to which extent
ballot stuffing and the mechanism of extreme fraud may
have contributed to these deviations, or if their influence
can be ruled out on the basis of the data. For the elec-
tions in Russia and Uganda they can not be ruled out.
As shown in Fig.S2, assumptions of their wide-spread
occurrences even allow to reproduce the observed vote
distributions to a good degree.
In conclusion it can be said with almost certainty that
an election does not represent the will of the people, if a
substantial fraction (fe) of units reports a 100% turnout
with almost all votes for a single party, and/or if any sig-
nificant deviations from the sigmoid form in the cumu-
lative distribution of votes versus turnout are observed.
Another indicator of systematic fraudulent or irregular
voting behavior is an incremental fraud parameter fi
which is significantly greater than zero on each aggre-
gation level.
Should such signals be detected it is tempting to in-
voke G.B. Shaw who held that ”[d]emocracy is a form of
government that substitutes election by the incompetent
many for appointment by the corrupt few.”
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
The data
Descriptive statistics and official sources of
the election results are shown in Tab.S1. The
raw data will be made available for download at
http://www.complex-systems.meduniwien.ac.at/. They
report election results of parliamentary (Austria,
Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Russia, Spain and
Switzerland), European (Poland) or presidential (France,
Romania, Russia, Uganda) elections on at least one
aggregation level. In the rare circumstances where elec-
toral districts report more valid ballots than registered
voters, we work with a turnout of 100%. Territorial units
with an electorate less than hundred are omitted at each
point of the analysis, to avoid extreme vote and turnout
rates as spurious results due to small communities. The
countries to include in this work have been chosen on
the basis of data availability. A country is included, if
the voting results are available in electronic form on an
aggregation level where a number of n¯pop ≤ 5000 vote
eligible persons comprises one territorial unit. Required
data is the number of vote eligible persons Ni, the
number of valid votes Vi and the number of votes for the
winning party/candidate Wi for each unit.
Model
A country is separated into n electoral units i, each
having an electorate of Ni people and in total Vi valid
votes. The fraction of valid votes for the winning party
in unit i is denoted vi. The average turnout over all
units, a¯, is given by a¯ = 1/n
∑
i(Vi/Ni) with standard
deviation sa, the mean fraction of votes v¯ for the win-
ning party is v¯ = 1/n
∑
i vi with standard deviation sv.
The mean values a¯ and v¯ are typically close to but not
identical to the values which maximize the empirical dis-
tribution function of turnout and votes over all units. Let
v be the number of votes where the empirical distribution
function assumes its (first local) maximum (rounded to
entire percents), see Fig. S7. Similarly a is the turnout
where the empirical distribution function of turnouts ai
takes its (first local) maximum. The distributions for
turnout and votes are extremely skewed to the right for
Uganda and Russia which also inflates the standard de-
viations in these countries, see Tab. S2. To account for
this a ’left-sided’ (’right-sided’) mean deviation σLv (σ
R
v )
from v is introduced. σRv can be regarded as the incre-
mental fraud width, a measurable parameter quantifying
how intense the vote stuffing is. This contributes to the
’smearing out’ of the main peaks in the election finger-
prints, see Fig.1 in the main text. The larger σRv , the
more inflated the vote results due to urn stuffing, in con-
trast to σLv which quantifies the scatter of the voters’
9actual preferences. They can be estimated from the data
by
σLv =
√
〈(vi − v)2〉vi<v , (1)
σRv =
√
〈(vi − v)2〉vi>v . (2)
Similarly the extreme fraud width σx can be estimated,
i.e. the width of the peak around 100% votes. We found
that σx = 0.075 describes all encountered vote distribu-
tions reasonably well. For a visualization of σLv , σ
R
v and
σx see Fig. S7.
While fi and fe measure in how many units incremen-
tal and extreme fraud occur, σRv and σx quantify how
intense these activities are, if they occur. To get an es-
timate for the width of the distribution of turnouts over
territorial unit which is free of possible fraudulent influ-
ences, the turnout distribution width σa is calculated from
electoral districts i which have both vi < v and ai < a,
that is σa =
√
〈(ai − a)2〉(ai<a)∧(vi<v).
Incremental fraud is a combination of two processes:
stuffing ballots for one party into the urn and re-casting
or deliberately wrong-counting ballots from other parties
(e.g. erasing the cross). Which one of these two processes
dominates is quantified by the deliberate wrong counting
parameter α > 0. For 0 < α < 1 the wrong-counting
process dominates, for α > 1 the urn stuffing mechanism
is prevalent. In the following N (µ, σ) denotes a normal
distributed random variable with mean µ and standard
deviation σ. The model is specified by the following pro-
tocol, which is applied to each district.
• Pick a unit i with electorate Ni taken from the
data.
• The model turnout of unit i, a
(m)
i , is N (a, σa).
• A fraction of v
(m)
i ∈ N (v,
√
(2)σLv ) people vote for
the winning party.
• With probability fi incremental fraud takes place.
In this case the unit is assigned a fraud intensity
xi ∈ |N (0,
√
σRv )|. Values for xi are only accepted
if they lie in the range 0 < xi < 1. This is the frac-
tion of votes not cast, (1−a
(m)
i )Ni, which are added
to the winning party. Votes for the opposition are
wrong counted for the winning party with a rate xαi
(where α is an exponent). To summarize, if incre-
mental fraud takes place the winning party receives
Ni
(
a
(m)
i v
(m)
i + xi(1− a
(m)
i ) + x
α
i (1− v
(m)
i )a
(m)
i
)
votes.
• With probability fe extreme fraud takes place. In
this case opposition votes are canceled and added
to the winning party with probability yi ∈ 1 −
|N (1, σx)| (i.e. the above with yi replacing xi).
Acceptable values for yi are again from the range
0 < yi < 1.
Fitting the model
The parameters for incremental and extreme fraud, fi
and fe, as well as the deliberate wrong counting parame-
ter α, are estimated by a goodness-of-fit test. Let pdf(vi)
be the empirical distribution function of votes for the
winning party (the data is binned with one bin corre-
sponding to one percent) over all territorial units. The
distribution function for the model units pdf(v
(m)
i ) is cal-
culated for each set of (fi, fe, α) values where fi, fe ∈
{0, 0.01, 0.02, . . .1}, α ∈ {0, 0.1 . . .5}. We report values
for the fraud parameters where the statistic
S(fi, fe, α) =
n∑
i=1
(
pdf(vi)− pdf(v
(m)
i )
pdf(vi)
)2
(3)
assumes its minimum, averaged over 100 realizations over
the parameter space, see Tab.S3 for fi and fe.
The extreme fraud parameter fe is zero (within one
standard deviation) for almost all elections except Russia
(2003, 2007, 2011 and 2012) and Uganda. For very small
n (n < 100) estimates for fe become less robust. These
are also the only elections where the incremental fraud
parameter fi is not close to zero. Values for α for the
Russian elections are αRu03 = 2.5(1) (2003), αRu07 =
2.2(2) (2007), αRu11 = 2.3(3) (2011), αRu12 = 1.5(2)
(2012), and αUganda = 0.31(3) for Uganda. Results for
α from countries where fi is close to zero can not be
detected in a robust way and are superfluous, since there
0 v 1
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FIG. 7. A stylized version of an empirical vote distribution
function shows how v, σLv , σ
R
v and σx are estimated from
the election results. v is the maximum of the distribution
function. σLv measures the distribution width of values to the
left of v, i.e. smaller than v. The incremental fraud with σRv
measures the distribution width of values to the right of v,
i.e. larger than v. The extreme fraud width σx is the width
of the peak at 100% votes.
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FIG. 8. Comparison of results from 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2012
Russian elections and the fraud model. In the left column the
distributions of the number of districts with a given percent-
age of votes for United Russia is shown for data (blue) and
fraud model (red). The middle column shows the observed
vtds. The data from 2007, 2011 and 2012 shows the same
pattern, although the main cluster for United Russia is at a
higher percentage of votes. For 2003 there is a smaller num-
ber of districts with 100% turnout and votes, and the main
cluster is spread out to a smaller extent. The right column
shows fits for the data with the fraud model, using parameters
fi = 0.31, fe = 0.009 (2003), fi = 0.636, fe = 0.038 (2007),
fi = 0.64, fe = 0.033 (2011) and fi = 0.39, fe = 0.021 (2011).
are (almost) no deviations from the fair election case.
Special care is needed in the interpretation of fi and
fe values in countries where election units contain sev-
eral polling stations. It may be the case that extreme
fraud takes only in a subset of the polling stations within
a unit place. In that case extreme fraud would be indis-
tinguishable from the incremental fraud mechanism.
On alternative explanations for election
irregularities
It is hard to construct other plausible mechanisms lead-
ing to a large number of territorial units having 100%
turnout and votes for a single party than urn stuffing.
The case is not so clear for the ’smeared out’ main clus-
ter. In some cases, namely Canada and Finland, this
cluster also takes on a slightly different form. This effect
clearly does not inflate the turnout as much as it is the
case in Russia and Uganda, but it is nevertheless present.
In Canada the distribution of vote preferences is bi-
modal, with one peak around 50% and one around 10%
(of the vote eligible population), but with similar turnout
levels. This is a result of a large-scale heterogeneity in
the data: English and French Canada. Votes are shown
for the winning Conservatives. Looking at their results
by province, they tallied 16.5% votes cast in Quebec, but
more than 40% in eight of the remaining twelve other
provinces. As a consequence the logarithmic vote rate
kurtosis becomes inflated. However, these statistical de-
viations are perfectly distinguishable from the traces of
ballot stuffing, resulting in vanishing fraud parameters
on all aggregation levels.
Another possible mechanism leading to irregularities in
the voting results is successful voter mobilization. This
may lead to a correlation between turnout and a party’s
votes. The Finland elections, for example, where marked
by radical campaigns by the True Finns. They managed
to mobilize evenly spread out across the country, with
the exception of the Helsinki region, where the winning
National Coalition Party performed significantly better
than in the rest of the country.
